



UNSC

TALMUN'26

Agenda Item: Reforming or Replacing the UN Peacekeeping Operations to Address Operational Inefficiencies and Strengthen Global Conflict Response

Table of Contents

- 1. Letter from the Head of Academy**
- 2. Letter from the Under Secretary General**
- 3. Introduction To The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)**
- 4. Overview Of The Agenda Item**
 - 4.1 Reforming Or Replacing UN Peacekeeping Operations
 - 4.2 Factors Behind the Growing Criticism of Peacekeeping Operations
- 5. UN Peacekeeping Operations**
 - 5.1 What Are UN Peacekeeping Operations?
 - 5.2 Main Objectives Of UN Peacekeeping Missions
 - 5.3 How Peacekeeping Missions Are Authorized And Deployed?
- 6. General Obstacles In UN Peacekeeping Missions**
 - 6.1 Slow Decision-Making And Deployment
 - 6.2 Unclear Mandates And Limited Authority
 - 6.3 Lack Of Accountability And Oversight

Topic A: Analysis of Past Peacekeeping Failures

- 7. Case Study: South Sudan (2013-Active)**
 - 7.1 Background of The Conflict
 - 7.2 The Role of UNMISS
 - 7.3 Challenges Faced During the Mission
 - 7.4 The Impact of These Challenges on the Current Situation
- 8. Case Study: Haiti Mission (2004-2007)**
 - 8.1 Background of The Conflict
 - 8.2 Failures And Controversies of MINUSTAH
 - 8.3 Long-Term Impact On Stability And Security
- 9. Lessons Learned From Topic A**

Topic B: Improving Future Peacekeeping Operations

10. Key Countries and Their Current Policies on UN Peacekeeping

- a. United States of America
- b. China
- c. Russian Federation
- d. France
- e. United Kingdom

11. Possible Reforms To UN Peacekeeping

- a. Improving Mandates and Authority
- b. Faster and More Effective Deployment
- c. Stronger Control And Accountability Mechanisms


12. The Role Of The Security Council In Implementing Changes

- a. UNSC Resolution 2378 (2017) - Performance with Mandates
- b. UNSC Resolution 2436 (2018) - Rapid Deployment
- c. UNSC Resolution 2272 (2016) - Conduct and Discipline Measures
- d. UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) - Financing AU Peace Operations

13. Conclusion

14. Questions to Consider

15. Bibliography



1. Letter From the Head of the Academy

Dear Delegates,

With my absolute pleasure, I would like to extend a heartfelt welcome to each delegate who is participating in the third edition of TAL Model United Nations. As this conference's Head of the Academy, I can indicate that I am beyond agitated to witness your commitment and the talent in the matter of diplomacy that you will debate in this year's event.

This year, as we continue our academic journey in high dedication with six new committees. Some will highlight the global challenges that the people of today face everyday, while others aim to take you into worlds of pure imagination created by our imaginative team. Across this journey, I full-heartedly believe that you will find ways to overcome the tests awaiting you by utilizing your critical thinking skills.

As you step into the world of Model United Nations, I profoundly encourage you to think like diplomats and approach the agenda with creativity and resilience. Never forget that the new acquisitions you will gain during the conference will not only stay here; they will also stay with you and continue to help you during your life experiences, inspiring new generations.

Thank you all for being a part of this journey. I wish you all a delightful conference that pleases you both academically and socially. Remember that you are the ones who will make this path unforgettable for yourselves. If you ever need any further assistance, please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Best Regards,

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Head of Academy

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2. Letter From the Under Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

As the Under Secretary General of the United Nations Security Council, it is with great pleasure that I welcome you to TALMUN'26. I am really honored to be with you in this journey towards a clearer understanding of one of the most vital yet intricate issues that the global community faces today. In fact, throughout our conference, you will have to discuss this matter in a diplomatic manner, with strategic thinking, and a strong sense of accountability.

The agenda of this committee, Reforming or Replacing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to Address Operational Inefficiencies and Strengthen Global Conflict Response, calls for a thorough scrutiny of the role UN peacekeeping plays in today's world.

Undoubtedly, peacekeeping has contributed significantly to international peace and security; however, it is a fact that several missions have been hindered by issues such as delays in deployment, lack of clear mandates, poor accountability, and shortage of funds. Such flaws thus naturally lead to the question whether peacekeeping can be reformed to the point that it is effective or if new approaches should be explored.

As the Security Council, your role will be to illustrate past and current peacekeeping operations, evaluate reform initiatives in the works, and discuss realistic and workable solutions. You will have to strike a balance between political realities and operational needs, take into account the views of mainly permanent and non-permanent members, and put forward reforms which lead to efficiency, accountability, and rapid response without violating the UN principles. I highly recommend that you go through the guide as it contains essential important information and frameworks that will help us to have a fluent debate.

I wish this committee to be not only a challenging debate but also a gratifying one, thus giving you the chance to participate in a meaningful discussion and problem solving through teamwork. I am eager to see your contributions, ideas, and negotiation skills during the conference. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me via the email address below.

Best Regards,

Semih FAZLIOĞLU

Under Secretary General of the United Nations Security Council

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3. Introduction to The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN) and holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Established in 1945 following the devastation of World War II, the Council was designed to foster collective security and prevent future conflicts by providing a platform for diplomacy and decisive action. Operating under the framework of the UN Charter, it is one of the most powerful and influential organs within the international system.

The UNSC is unique in its ability to make legally binding decisions that all UN member states are obligated to implement, setting it apart from other UN organs. It is authorised to take a range of measures to address threats to peace, including imposing economic sanctions, approving military interventions, and deploying peacekeeping forces to conflict zones. Its resolutions and mandates are central to international efforts in conflict resolution, crisis management, and the enforcement of international law.

The member states in the council are divided into two categories; Five permanent members (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These nations wield the influential power of veto, allowing any one of them to block substantive resolutions regardless of majority support.

Non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with seats distributed to ensure geographic representation across different regions of the world.

The UNSC's agenda is extensive and addresses some of the most pressing global challenges, including armed conflicts, nuclear non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and the protection of civilians in war zones. It also plays a significant role in overseeing the implementation of peace agreements and supporting the establishment of post-conflict stability and governance.

4. Overview Of The Agenda Item

4.1 Reforming Or Replacing UN Peacekeeping Operations

Reforming or replacing UN peacekeeping operations refers to the discussion on whether the current peacekeeping system of the United Nations can be improved or whether a new approach is needed. UN peacekeeping missions were originally created to support ceasefires and assist countries in moving from conflict toward peace. However, conflicts have become more complex over time, and many missions now face challenges that go out from their original purpose. Reforming peacekeeping focuses on strengthening existing missions

through effective mandates, improved training, stronger accountability, and faster deployment. Replacing peacekeeping, on the other hand, involves considering alternative mechanisms such as regional forces or different international security arrangements. This agenda asks Member States to evaluate both options and decide how the international community should respond to modern conflicts more effectively.

4.2 Factors Behind the Growing Criticism of Peacekeeping Operations

UN peacekeeping efforts are currently under scrutiny since they have failed to resolve disputes in an efficient manner. Slow decision-making, ambiguous directives, and a lack of resources are issues that many missions deal with. Peacekeepers were sometimes unable to defend civilians during unexpected acts of violence, which led to criticism and a decline in confidence among the local populace. It is also more difficult for missions to take swift and decisive action due to political actions inside the Security Council. Additionally, armed organizations that disregard peace accords and protocols are frequently involved in contemporary conflicts, which reduces the efficacy of conventional peacekeeping techniques. For these reasons, several nations began to wonder if peacekeeping efforts in their existing configuration were appropriate for the wars of today.

5. UN Peacekeeping Operations

5.1 What are UN Peacekeeping Operations?

Peacekeeping by the United Nations is a role of the United Nations's Department of Peace Operations and a tool developed by the organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace. Peacekeeping operations is one of the tools most effective to the UN to assist host countries conduct the difficult path from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to implement and sustain troops and police worldwide. Peacekeeping is flexible and over the past two decades has been deployed in many configurations. In the past, UN peacekeeping missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. Peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful means. With the change of Dynamics worldwide, peacekeeping operations are getting more challenging and demanding every day. Peacekeeping missions have transformed into peace enforcement missions too.

5.2 Main Objectives of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations have crucial goals to strive to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament and reintegration of old combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. UN peacekeeping is one of its most visible tools for conflict management. Peacekeeping missions support countries which are affected by deploying civilian, police, and military personnel to help maintain peace and protect civilians. This may include assistance in the disarmament and reintegration of previous combatants, the training of police officers, or the distribution of unauthorized points.

All missions require both a UN Security Council mandate and host country consent. Some critical evidence shows that peacekeeping effectively works and peacekeeping operations has proven to be one of the most effective tools worldwide. Several studies systematically establish that UN peacekeeping is effective in protecting civilians, preventing civil war recurrence, reducing the death toll, containing violence, and limiting refugee flows. Moreover, the prospect of UN peacekeeping facilitates peace settlement.

5.3 How Peacekeeping Operations are Authorized and Deployed

There are three main principles for UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. Firstly, UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Secondly, UN peacekeepers have to be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict. However, to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must carefully avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. The third one is non use of force or punishment except self defence principle. A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate attitude, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. As a conflict develops, worsens, or approaches resolution, the UN is frequently involved in a number of consultations to determine the best response by the international community. Thereafter, the Secretariat deploys a technical assessment mission to the country or area where the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping operation is envisaged. The assessment mission analyzes and assesses the overall security, political, military, humanitarian and human rights situation in the area. Based on the findings and recommendations of the assessment mission, the UN Secretary General will issue a report which involves present options for the establishment of a peacekeeping as appropriate and also size and resources to the Security Council. After the report, UNSC takes into consideration the report which also includes financial implications and if the best

possible way is deploying UN peacekeepers, the secretary general appoints a head of mission who is responsible for managing the mission, Force Commander and Police Commissioner. The Secretary General is required to provide regular reports to the Security Council on the implementation of the mission mandate. Security Council taking into consideration reports and briefings, and renews and adjusts the mission mandate, as required, until the missions are completed.

6. General Obstacles In UN Peacekeeping Missions

6.1 Slow Decision Making and Deployment

For UN peacekeeping operations, one of the most questioned issues is slow decision making and deployment, which can directly affect conflicts. After the Security Council resolution, a peacekeeping mission can take as long as two years to reach full operational capacity, which is a very long period when a conflict is raging. With slow responses, violent conflicts tend to escalate and spread, increasing destruction and suffering, as well as the need for later and longer operations at higher costs. When UN forces are deployed during the early stages of violence, they can alter power dynamics by restraining armed groups and limiting territorial advances. Conversely, delayed deployments allow armed actors to gain ground, harden frontlines, and prolong the conflict. There is broad consensus that rapid deployment is critical to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, but member states have long resisted reforms that would guarantee a UN rapid reaction capability. Nevertheless, states, UN officials, and policy experts have continued to propose, debate, and even implement measures aimed at enhancing UN rapid deployment.

6.2 Unclear Mandates and Limited Authority

UN peace operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Their assignments depend on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents. Peacekeepers face a lot of challenges, whether these involve coping with vast or complex terrain, ongoing violence, or immediate humanitarian situations. Without a clear definition of what the protection of civilians entails, achieving it is unexpected. While operational definitions are evolving, achieving consensus on effective protection strategies remains a critical challenge, also emphasizing the importance of strategic clarity in various contexts. Without essential resources such as personnel, equipment, logistical support, and funding, missions cannot effectively protect civilians, facilitate dialogue or contribute to stabilization.

6.3 Lack of Accountability and Oversight

Particularly, even if UN forces were aware of the possibility of being under an imminent attack or were in proximity to areas in which abuses were committed, they failed to protect civilians. In many investigations and reports on these incidents, shortcomings in performance were underlined and the need for greater accountability was highlighted. Despite these remarks, however, there is still limited accountability for peacekeepers involved in missions to protect civilians. Not only have peacekeepers failed to protect civilians, but UN peacekeeping operations have also occasionally been a source of harm to the local population. Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers have seriously tainted the UN's reputation, and no initiatives have successfully eliminated these abuses.

The cholera epidemic in Haiti is a clear example of the negative consequences that peacekeeping operations may have for vulnerable communities in a country. Against this background, it has been argued that UN peacekeeping operations should be carried out in a more accountable manner by providing redress to victims and taking effective measures to prevent harmful conduct by peacekeepers.

7. Case Study: South Sudan (2013-Active)

7.1 Background of the Conflict

South Sudan became an independent country in 2011 but soon descended into civil war. In December 2013, a political dispute between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar turned violent, with Kiir backed mostly by the Dinka ethnic group and Machar by the Nuer. Fighting quickly spread to much of the country, causing massive suffering. Observers estimate nearly 400,000 people were killed and about 4 million were displaced by 2017. Armed forces on both sides often targeted civilians, and abuses such as rape and child soldier recruitment were widespread. Several peace agreements (e.g. in 2015 and 2018) tried to end the war and a unity government was formed in 2020, but serious fighting and unrest have continued in many areas.

7.2 The Role of UNMISS

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was set up in 2011 to help stabilize the new nation and protect civilians. After the civil war began, the UN Security Council strengthened UNMISS's mandate to defend people at risk, even allowing troops to use force when needed. Over the years, UNMISS grew into one of the largest peacekeeping missions, with around 15,000–17,000 soldiers and police from many countries. The mission's main tasks are to protect civilians, support the peace process, help deliver humanitarian aid, and promote human rights and the rule of law. In practice, UNMISS has set up large "protection of civilians" camps at its bases where people fleeing violence can shelter. It also

helps train South Sudan's security forces, monitors ceasefires, and assists with organizing elections and rebuilding government services.

7.3 Challenges Faced During the Mission

UNMISS has faced many challenges in the field. South Sudan's huge size, poor roads and seasonal floods make it hard for peacekeepers to reach troubled areas quickly. The mission must also coordinate closely with the South Sudanese government and sometimes obtain permission before moving, which can slow urgent action. There have been cases where UN forces were unable or unwilling to intervene in attacks on civilians; for example, during a 2016 attack on a camp in Malakal many displaced people were killed while UN troops stayed inside their base instead of engaging the fighters. The government has at times restricted UNMISS patrols with roadblocks and bureaucracy, even detaining some UN staff, which violates the mission's agreements and hurts its work. Other problems have included shortages of transport and medical support, communications difficulties, and harsh weather.

There have also been incidents of misconduct by peacekeepers themselves; for example, in 2018 a UN police unit was withdrawn after reports of sexual exploitation in a refugee camp. All these factors (limited resources, logistical barriers, local interference and some misconduct) have made it hard for UNMISS to carry out its mandate fully.

7.4 The Impact of These Challenges on the Current Situation

Because UNMISS has struggled with these problems, South Sudan remains in a fragile state. The 2018 peace agreement has only been partly implemented, and the transitional government's power sharing has moved slowly. Violence and ethnic clashes still flare up in parts of the country, including attacks by militias and disputes over cattle and land. Many South Sudanese remain displaced in camps, and humanitarian needs are very high (for example, a major hunger crisis and flooding are affecting millions). The delays and limits on UNMISS's work mean that local conflicts often go unchecked, and ordinary people still fear for their safety. The upcoming elections have been postponed amid the instability. In short, the difficulties encountered by UNMISS have contributed to ongoing insecurity in South Sudan. The country continues to rely heavily on international aid and peacekeepers, and the long-term peace process is still at risk, highlighting why many observers see a need for improving how UN peacekeeping missions operate.

8. Case Study: Haiti Mission (2004-2007)

8.1 Background of the Conflict

The small Caribbean nation of Haiti is located slightly above South America and shares a border with the Dominican Republic, to the east of Cuba. Haiti's modern-day

struggle for democracy began in the 1980s when a new constitution was adopted to ensure that Haiti would never allow another dictatorship to form. However, the Haitian public had grown tired of poverty, exploitation, and inequality. The new constitution was written in 1986. During this period, people began to question Jean-Bertrand Aristide's presidency, which caused national disturbances. In 2004, violent uprisings by his opponents supporters led to a coup, forcing him to flee the country. One week later, the United Nations unanimously voted on Resolution 1529 to deploy a Multinational Temporary Force to Haiti. This force was a three month mission dedicated to addressing the political, security, and humanitarian problems that Haiti was facing. At the same time that political instability was developing, Haiti experienced high crime rates, particularly involving gangs, kidnappings, and sexual crimes. During those three months, the United Nations also drafted a resolution for an official peacekeeping mission in Haiti, named MINUSTAH.

8.2 Failures and Controversies of MINUSTAH

Furthermore, a special representative to Haiti was appointed to oversee and report to the United Nations on the situation. On the issue of human rights violations within the nation of Haiti, the UN opened an investigation into these circumstances to help end them. In the first period of MINUSTAH authorization, the mission's peacekeeping forces consisted of civilian and military personnel from surrounding countries. In 2005, Brussels held an international donor conference, which included countries and organizations from around the world that committed over one billion dollars to help Haiti's political and humanitarian crisis.

Unfortunately, a major part of the money couldn't make it to Haiti. The cholera epidemic appeared in Haiti again in October 2010, almost 100 years after its disappearance from the island. Moreover, the epidemic spread rapidly to Haiti's cities. The cholera epidemic has killed over 10,000 Haitians since then and has also infected over 820,000 people. Then, on January 12 2010 a large-scale earthquake occurred. The Haitian government's official death count was more than 300,000, which made the earthquake's aftermath one of the worst natural disasters in recorded history, and hundreds of thousands of survivors were displaced. UN Security Council Resolution 1927 deployed an additional 680 police officers to Haiti for earthquake relief. Hundreds of Haitians relied on the Artibonite River for water supply, especially after the earthquake. Later, it was found that UN peacekeepers were responsible for the outbreak. Nepalese peacekeepers were discovered to have dumped their waste next to the Artibonite River. The United Nations refused to open an investigation, stating that there was no conclusive evidence that UN peacekeepers were responsible for the epidemic.

In 2016, the UN Secretary-General apologized to the people of Haiti for the outbreak, after thousands of Haitians were killed over the course of six years. One of the most conspicuous controversies was sexual abuse and exploitation of women and children throughout the MINUSTAH mandates, in which UN peacekeepers were involved. Additionally, a common story told around Haiti involved UN peacekeepers offering money or food in exchange for sexual favors.

Multiple peacekeepers were found assaulting young men and women on several occasions. Since 2007, the UN has reported that it received 116 allegations of sexual abuse committed by UN peacekeepers across Haiti. Several other reports support these allegations. UN peacekeepers also used violence against defenseless Haitians. One of the clearest examples of this abuse occurred when a 16-year-old Haitian boy was found dead, hanging from the ceiling of a UN peacekeeping base, and a UN autopsy declared his death a suicide. All of these circumstances show that UN peacekeepers, who were sent to Haiti to protect Haitians from violence and gangs, were also committing the same crimes against the Haitian population.

8.3 Long-term Impact on Stability and Security

MINUSTAH's peacekeeping mission clearly shook the trust held in the UN not only by the Haitian people but also worldwide due to these circumstances which violated the fundamental rights of the Haitian population, and the UN didn't apologize for six years after the epidemic. The UN must therefore take full accountability. One incident that can be seen as commendable was the support strategy of the United Nations for the Government of Haiti. The government moved to work toward eliminating the transmission of cholera. Moreover, this support was provided not only through MINUSTAH but also through UN agencies and funds such as UNICEF, the Pan American Health Organization, and WHO.

9. Lessons Learned From Topic A

Peacekeeping is a creation of the United Nations, and it plays an essential role in UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. However, peacekeeping has also generated backlash, which clearly shows that UN peacekeeping needs to be improved through institutional reforms to increase the effectiveness of missions.

UN peacekeeping missions prove that slow decision-making and delayed deployment during the early stages of conflict significantly affect the course of events and, as a result, interrupt the effectiveness of missions. Additionally, unclear mandates provide excuses for peacekeepers and create obstacles in managing conflicts. These factors also weaken the protection of civilians. The lack of accountability allows operational failures or misconduct to remain insufficiently addressed. This leads to a loss of trust between the UN and the global public. One example of this is the Haiti mission. UN peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH serves as an essential example of the negative repercussions associated with UN peacekeeping missions. MINUSTAH faced grave allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by its peacekeeping personnel, who were supposed to protect civilians.

10. Key Countries and Their Current Policies on UN Peacekeeping

a. United States of America

- i. Funding and Reform: The U.S. is by far the largest assessed contributor to UN peacekeeping (about 27% of the budget). (By U.S. law it is capped at 25%, a limit that has created unpaid arrears and prompted recent bills to lift the cap.) Washington D.C. argues that full payment of dues is needed to retain influence on reforms. U.S. officials consistently push for performance accountability, streamlined management and cost-efficiency (for example, past U.S.-UN efforts cut the cost per peacekeeper by 18%), and for clear, achievable mandates. U.S. policy calls for strong oversight and unified political strategy in missions.
- ii. Troops and Support: The U.S. contributes virtually no combat troops to UN operations (only about 18 uniformed personnel as of late 2025). Instead it focuses on capacity-building for other contributors (e.g. via the Global Peace Operations Initiative) and provides training, logistics and intelligence support. U.S. leaders emphasize that UN peacekeeping is a highly cost-effective tool (GAO studies note it can be up to 8× cheaper than a U.S. military deployment).
- iii. Strategic Interests: The U.S. values UN missions as a force-multiplier that addresses conflicts with minimal U.S. ground commitment. It uses its financial clout to promote American priorities (especially civilian protection, human rights and counter-terrorism) and to ensure major powers share burdens. U.S. reports have noted China’s growing influence in peacekeeping (now 18–19% of the budget) and pressure it to oppose certain human-rights mandates. In response, U.S. policy ties funding and political support to achieving reforms that align UN peacekeeping with the U.S interests and values.

b. China

- i. Funding and Reform: China is now the second-largest UN peacekeeping funder (about 18-19% of the budget) and reliably pays its assessed dues on time. Chinese statements say they back “all necessary reforms” to strengthen the UN, including better efficiency and giving developing countries more voice. China often calls for Security Council reform (more seats for Global South). In practice, Beijing stresses the principle of sovereignty and non-interference. This generally opposes mandates which sees as unduly

involving human-rights or internal politics of host states.

- ii. *Troops and Support:* In recent years China has dramatically increased its troop contribution to UN missions. It now fields roughly 1,800,000 personnel on peacekeeping duty (including many police officers) far more than any other permanent member except the U.S. on finance. (In 2021 China even pledged an 8,000-strong standby force for UN use.)

Most Chinese peacekeepers serve in African missions, where China has substantial economic and security interests. China also built a domestic “Peacekeeping Affairs Centre” (2018) and leads UN training workshops for peacekeepers, reflecting its active role.

- iii. *Strategic Interests:* China sees UN peacekeeping as a tool to protect their own country and projects (especially in Africa), to gain military experience abroad, and to burnish its global image. Beijing is leveraging its contribution into greater influence in UN bodies (reportedly vying to appoint Chinese officials to top UN Peace Operations posts). In sum, China balances its talk of reform with moves that advance its state-centric vision of peacekeeping and its long-term geopolitical interests.

c. Russian Federation

- i. *Funding and Reform:* Russia’s assessed share of UN peacekeeping costs is relatively small (about 2.3%, placing it roughly 10th among UN members). Moscow pays its dues but nowhere near its share in rank or finance compared with the other P5. In speeches, Russian UN diplomats praise peacekeeping’s role but insist mandates respect host-state consent and sovereignty. They often criticize what they call “mission creep” into climate, human-rights or gender agendas, arguing that these can distract from core objectives. Russia stresses that UN missions must be realistic, focused on ceasefire monitoring and political reconciliation, with clear goals defined by the parties and Council.
- ii. *Troops and Support:* Russia contributes very few uniformed personnel (only around 60 total to all UN missions as of late 2025) mainly staff officers and police. Russia’s own on-the-ground military engagements (e.g. in Syria, or its separate “peacekeepers” in Nagorno-Karabakh under CIS auspices) lie outside UN frameworks. Russia does not run a bilateral training program like Western P5, so its direct operational support to UN missions is minimal beyond diplomatic backing.

iii. Strategic Interests: Russia treats peacekeeping as one arena among many where great-power politics play out. It uses UNPK debates to defend its allies and preferred approaches. For example, Russia has promoted closer UN–Regional cooperation (Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), championing African Union or Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) forces to handle conflicts if UN missions flounder. Moscow’s approach is generally reactive, it vetoes or opposes UN actions it sees as hostile to its interests (and recently Ukraine). In summary, Russia’s UN peacekeeping policy underscores state sovereignty and local ownership over interventionist mandates, reflecting its strategic preference for regional solutions and allied governments control.

d. France

- i. Funding and Reform: France is a significant UN contributor (about 5.3-5.6% of the UNPK budget), regularly paying its assessed share. They also give substantial voluntary aid (e.g. large humanitarian contributions through UN agencies). Paris strongly supports UN operations as a multilateral tool, especially in Francophone Africa. France advocates reforming peacekeeping for better impact; for example, it has backed efforts to improve mission efficiency and accountability.
- ii. Troops and Support: France is one of the few Western P5 that still deploys meaningful forces to UN missions (about 600–700 troops/police in 2025). Its main contingents have served in Africa (Mali’s MINUSMA, CAR’s MINUSCA) and Lebanon (UNIFIL). Beyond troops, France deploys hundreds of “cooperation officers” (military/police advisors) to train partner-country forces before and during UN missions. They also contribute equipment, police units and specialized experts (engineering, medical) to bolster mission capacity.
- iii. Mandate Emphasis: France typically pushes for robust mandates focused on civilian protection and counter-terrorism, reflecting its own security priorities in Sahel and Middle East. They insist on clear political roadmaps in mandates and support integrated approaches (military, police, rule-of-law, gender programs). France has been an early advocate of Women, Peace and Security in UNPK (pressing for more female peacekeepers and action against sexual violence). Their foreign ministry highlights peacekeeping as “an irreplaceable lever for lasting political solutions,” and French UN envoys often emphasize that missions must help build local governance and security sector capacity.
- iv. Strategic Interests: France uses UN peacekeeping to maintain influence in key regions. Strong engagement in African missions aligns with their

counter-terrorism and development goals in former colonies. By leading (or co-sponsoring) multilateral efforts, France projects power and shares the burden of stabilization. They see peacekeeping missions as essential for global security (and for European security indirectly). In 2024–25 France also served as Security Council President and hosted debates on peacekeeping, underlining its political support for reforming and strengthening UNPKOs.

e. United Kingdom

- i. *Funding and Reform:* The UK is the fifth-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping costs (around 5.36% of the budget). British leaders strongly back the UN framework and regularly call for mandate reform. In 2024 the UK supported the UN “Pact for the Future” commitments that operations be given “clear, sequenced and prioritized” mandates, realistic exit strategies, and full compliance with international law. The UK emphasizes accountability, mission clarity and the protection of UN personnel.
- ii. *Troops and Support:* Britain now contributes only a few hundred personnel (roughly 240–260 as of 2024–25). UK peacekeepers serve mainly as staff officers and trainers in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Lebanon (UNIFIL), DRC (MONUSCO) and South Sudan (UNMISS). Historically the UK provided thousands of infantry in the 1990s/2000s, but recent contributions are much smaller. Alongside UN deployments, the UK runs major training programs for African and Asian forces who then join UN missions (e.g. funding battalions in Darfur, Sinai, etc.).
- iii. *Stance and Interests:* The UK champions UN peacekeeping as a cornerstone of multilateral security. It routinely uses their UNSC seat to press for mission effectiveness and the safety of peacekeepers. For instance, in 2024 the UK joined France, Germany and Italy in condemning attacks on UNIFIL troops and demanding all parties respect UNIFIL’s mandate and personnel. At the UNGA, UK officials (including PM Keir Starmer in 2024) warned that the institutions of peace are “underfunded, under pressure and over-politicized,” calling for renewed energy and commitment to make peacekeeping “fit for purpose”. In short, the UK pushes for strong, practical mandates, adequate resources, and full international support to ensure peace operations succeed.

11. Possible Reforms To UN Peacekeeping

11.1 Improving Mandates and Authority

In some missions, weak or unclear mandates have made it impossible for peacekeepers to stop violence even though they knew how to solve the problem. A clear example is the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: authorized in 2013 with a Chapter VII “use all necessary means” mandate, the FIB (equipped and tasked to neutralize armed groups) helped defeat the M23 rebels and showed that a solid mandate can produce visible results. At the same time, gains proved hard to hold because other UN units were not always able to follow up and because political and coordination problems limited long term success.

South Sudan offers a different lesson. When civil war broke out in 2013 the Security Council expanded UNMISS’s mandate and increased troop numbers so that the mission could better protect civilians. This allowed UNMISS to create protection sites and to act more forcefully at key moments, but even with a stronger mandate the mission could not guarantee safety everywhere. In short, stronger mandates can help in emergency situations, but they only work when matched by enough troops, equipment, funding and clear political support from each individual otherwise much of the mandate stays “on paper.”

11.2 Faster and More Effective Deployment

One of the most consistent problems in UN peacekeeping has been the slow deployment of forces after a mission is official. In the 1990s, the UN attempted to solve this by creating the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), which allowed member states to assign troops or police units for rapid deployment. While this looked effective on paper, it failed in practice because participation was voluntary and states were not legally bound to deploy their assigned forces. Independent reviews later described UNSAS as slow and unreliable, and many missions still took months or even years to reach the field. This showed that technical planning alone could not overcome political hesitation.

To improve on this system, the UN introduced the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) in 2018. PCRS organizes assigned units into readiness tiers, with the highest level (the Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)) requiring forces to be deployable within 60 days. Some countries committed troops and police units to this system, and in 2023 states such as Italy and Kenya supported the idea of a 5,000 strong “Vanguard Brigade” that could reinforce missions faster. Despite these developments, PCRS has not yet been fully tested in an actual crisis. No new peacekeeping mission has depended on RDL units so far, and analysts note that without clear incentives, funding, and political pressure, states remain neutral to keep forces on constant standby.

Beyond personnel, the UN has achieved more visible progress in logistics and support. The UN Global Service Centre in Brindisi manages Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), which

include vehicles, communications equipment, and medical facilities that can be sent rapidly to missions. Between 2024 and 2025, SDS delivered millions of dollars worth of equipment to missions such as UNMISS, MINUSCA, and UNIFIL, helping speed up their early operational phases.

Regional organizations have also explored rapid response models: the African Union created the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in 2013, and the European Union established its Rapid Deployment Capacity in 2018. However, both initiatives have struggled to deploy due to political disagreements and limited commitment. These examples can highlight a recurring lesson: faster deployment is possible technically, but without strong political will and sustained funding, rapid response remains difficult to achieve.

11.3 Stronger Control and Accountability Mechanisms

Misconduct by peacekeepers and weak oversight have been long standing criticisms of UN peacekeeping operations. After major scandals in the early 2000s, particularly in Liberia, the UN began to take clearer steps toward accountability. In 2005, the UN required all large peacekeeping missions to establish Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs). These units were created to monitor behavior, handle allegations, and support victims. For example, UNMIL in Liberia set up a CDT that coordinated investigations, ran prevention campaigns, and worked with local communities through initiatives such as the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Network. Since then, every major mission has had dedicated personnel responsible for tracking misconduct and enforcing standards, alongside repeated commitments from UN leadership to a zero tolerance policy.

Despite these reforms, real accountability still depends largely on troop contributing countries. Peacekeepers remain under their home country's military justice system, not UN courts. A well-known case occurred in 2007 in Haiti, when allegations of sexual abuse by Sri Lankan peacekeepers emerged; the unit was repatriated and banned from future missions, but criminal prosecutions were limited. Similar patterns have appeared in later missions such as MINUSCA in the Central African Republic and MONUSCO in the DRC. To respond, the UN introduced stricter screening, mandatory training, and reporting requirements, and established a Trust Fund to support victims. These steps improved reporting and awareness, but many cases still result in little or no punishment, which continues to undermine trust among local populations.

Accountability also includes how well missions perform overall, not only individual behavior. To address this, the UN strengthened oversight through tools such as Integrated Assessment and Planning processes, regular benchmark reporting to the Security Council, and audits by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). These mechanisms review mission effectiveness, spending, and compliance with mandates. In some cases, local institutions and civil society groups have also been involved in monitoring UN behavior.

However, critics note that political resistance from member states and limited enforcement powers restrict how far these mechanisms can go. Past experience shows that while accountability structures now exist on paper, their effectiveness depends heavily on political will, transparency, and sustained support from member states.

12. The Role Of The Security Council in Implementing Possible Changes

a. UNSC Resolution 2378 (2017) - Performance with Mandates

- i. Resolution 2378 (2017) was mainly aimed at enhancing the process of designing and reviewing UN peacekeeping mandates. Prior to this resolution, many peacekeeping missions were operating with general and extensive mandates that were not clearly ordered in terms of priority. This resolution, therefore, the Security Council requested that the mandates of peacekeeping missions be more achievable, prioritized, and connected with the resources, political strategies, and the situation on the ground. It also provided for a more precise set of criteria for assessing a mission's work and encouraged strategic reviews on a regular basis instead of automatic renewals of mandates.

In addition, the resolution made it clear that peacekeeping missions should be facilitators of political processes and not substitutes for political processes and it also underscored the significance of collaboration between the Security Council, the Secretariat; and troop, personnel, and police contributing countries.

However, mandates still tended to be overloaded in spite of these improvements. New tasks were added without the removal of old ones, benchmarks were not used uniformly, and mandate renewals were often handled as merely procedural rather than strategic decisions. As a consequence, missions had to endure overstretch and a lack of clear priorities.

- ii. Possible Implementation: Building on Resolution 2378, this committee could make stronger mandate reforms by introducing longer and more planned mandate periods. Peacekeeping mandates could be adopted for a 12-month period (this is an exemplary value) with a mandatory mid-term review focused specifically on performance, applicability, and resource alignment.

During this review, the Secretariat would be required to assess whether assigned tasks remain realistic and recommend adjustments or reductions where necessary. Mandates could be clearly structured by distinguishing between essential core tasks and secondary tasks that depend on sufficient

capacity and funding. Such an approach would reduce mandate inflation, improve accountability, and allow the Security Council to respond more effectively to changing conditions on the ground while maintaining political oversight.

b. UNSC Resolution 2436 (2018) - Rapid Deployment

- i. Resolution 2436 (2018) addressed long-standing problems related to the slow deployment and uneven performance of UN peacekeeping forces. Before this resolution, significant delays often occurred between the authorization of missions and the arrival of troops on the ground. To address this, the Security Council endorsed the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS), encouraging Member States to pre-register trained and well-equipped military and police units for faster deployment. The resolution emphasized timely deployment as a core performance requirement and called for more transparent and systematic evaluations of troop and police contingents. It also linked reimbursement and continued participation in peacekeeping operations to meeting readiness and performance standards, aiming to incentivize higher levels of preparedness.

Despite these measures, the impact of the resolution remained limited. PCRS participation was voluntary, and many pledged units could not be deployed within required timelines due to equipment shortages, transport constraints, or national political considerations. The UN still lacked standing forces and guaranteed strategic airlift, meaning that rapid deployment continued to rely on ad hoc arrangements and external donor support.

- ii. Possible Implementation: To build on Resolution 2436, this committee could strengthen rapid deployment by establishing a structured and binding rapid readiness framework within PCRS. A limited pool of high-readiness units could be designated for rapid deployment with clearly defined timelines, such as deployment within 30 to 60 days after mandate authorization. In exchange, these units would receive enhanced reimbursement rates and guaranteed logistical support, including pre-arranged strategic airlift.

The Secretariat would be responsible for regular verification of readiness standards, while funding for pre-deployment and transport could be approved through a dedicated budget line. Mandates could include an initial pilot phase, reviewed periodically, to assess whether faster deployment improves mission effectiveness. This approach would reduce early-mission security gaps,

increase the credibility of Security Council decisions, and ensure that authorized mandates are supported by deployable capabilities.

c. UNSC Resolution 2272 (2016) - Conduct and Discipline Measures

- i. Resolution 2272 (2016) was passed after the credibility of peacekeeping missions was severely damaged due to repeated instances of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers. Prior to this resolution, the cases of misconduct were almost entirely dealt with by the troop, contributing countries and had very little consequences at the UN level.

With the adoption of Resolution 2272, the Security Council reaffirmed the UNs zero tolerance policy and unveiled a tougher response mechanism. Most notably, it gave the Secretary General the authority to send back the whole military or police contingents if there was credible evidence of widespread or systematic SEA committed by members of that unit. Besides, the resolution urged the troop, and police, contributing countries to tighten vetting procedures and pre-deployment training, thereby making peacekeeping standards of conduct more directly linked to participation.

Although Resolution 2272 signaled a tougher stance, its effectiveness remained limited. The UN still depends on troop-contributing countries to investigate and prosecute their own personnel, and in many cases these investigations are slow or inconclusive. Repatriation removes offending units from the field but does not guarantee accountability or justice for victims. As a result, SEA cases have continued in some missions, demonstrating that disciplinary authority without enforcement power is insufficient to fully address the problem.

- ii. Possible Implementation: To build on Resolution 2272, this committee could focus on closing the gap between disciplinary action and accountability. The Security Council could require troop- and police-contributing countries to meet clear investigation and prosecution timelines as a condition for continued participation in peacekeeping operations. Failure to comply could result in temporary suspension from contributing new contingents.

In addition, the Secretary General could be mandated to publish regular, country-specific reports on how SEA cases are handled after repatriation, increasing transparency and political pressure. By strengthening follow-up mechanisms rather than relying solely on withdrawal of troops, the Council would turn zero tolerance from a political statement into a more enforceable

standard.

d. UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) - Financing AU Peace Operations

- i. Resolution 2719 (2023) marked a significant shift in how peace operations led by the African Union (AU) could be financed. For the first time, the Security Council created a framework that allows AU peace support operations to receive funding from UN assessed contributions. Under this model, up to 75% of an authorized AU mission's budget may be covered by UN funds, while the remaining share is provided by the AU and other partners. The resolution established a hybrid financing approach, in which the UN and AU jointly develop a workplan, budget, and oversight arrangements once a mission is authorized by the Council. The goal was to provide more predictable and sustainable funding for AU-led operations, which often operate in high-risk environments with limited resources.

Despite its importance, Resolution 2719 has so far seen very limited implementation. Political divisions within the Security Council, particularly concerns over financial oversight and cost control, have prevented the mechanism from being fully activated. Attempts to apply the framework to ongoing AU operations faced resistance, and no mission has yet received funding through this model. At the same time, the UN peacekeeping budget faces serious financial strain due to unpaid contributions by Member States. As a result, AU missions continue to rely largely on voluntary and ad hoc funding, undermining the predictability that Resolution 2719 was meant to provide.

- ii. Possible Implementation: To make Resolution 2719 operational, this committee could focus on clarifying procedures and reducing political hesitation around funding. The Security Council could require that, once an AU mission is authorized, the Secretary-General present a finalized cost-sharing and oversight plan within a fixed timeframe, such as 30 days. This would prevent delays caused by prolonged negotiations.

In parallel, the General Assembly could be encouraged to provisionally reserve a portion of the peacekeeping budget for AU operations approved under this framework, to be released once agreed conditions are met. The Council could also mandate regular joint reporting by the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission on mission performance and financial accountability. By improving transparency and predictability, this approach would strengthen regional peace operations while maintaining UN oversight, helping bridge capability gaps without creating parallel or competing systems.


13. Conclusion

One of the Security Council's most important and politically delicate tools for preserving global peace and security is still UN peacekeeping. However, the effectiveness and credibility of peace operations have been steadily declining due to persistent challenges in the areas of mandate formulation, slow and uneven deployment, lack of accountability, and unpredictable financing, as this study guide has demonstrated. These issues are different facets of a structural system that requires coordinated and ongoing reform rather than discrete failures.

The Security Council's role is in the middle of these issues. On the one hand, the Council has passed a number of resolutions aimed at improving peacekeeping operations. However, the implementation of these resolutions has been inconsistent because of political differences, a lack of follow-up, and ineffective enforcement mechanisms. The pace at which peacekeeping adapts to contemporary conflict situations will depend on the Council's ability to translate the ambitious mandates into well-resourced missions in a realistic, sufficient, and accountable manner. Even well-planned reforms are likely to remain mostly declaratory in the absence of strong political commitment, clear prioritization, and close collaboration with the Secretariat, troops, and police.

As a result, this committee gives delegates a chance to interact with the practical choices that influence missions on the ground and go beyond merely endorsing peacekeeping. Delegates are urged to take into account the political limitations of the Security Council, strike a balance between ambition and practicality, and suggest solutions that improve implementation rather than just extending mandates. The Security Council's determination and coherence in pursuing reform will determine the future of UN peacekeeping, not whether reform is discussed.

14. Questions to Consider

1. What are the essential lessons that can be drawn from UN peacekeeping failures?
 2. What monitoring mechanisms can be established to ensure that lessons learned are implemented effectively?
 3. How can UN peacekeeping missions be reformed to improve effectiveness?
 4. What are the main causes and factors leading to the questioning of UN peacekeeping missions and how can they be addressed?
 5. How has the lack of accountability affected trust in UN peacekeeping missions?
 6. How can past UN peacekeeping reforms be strengthened?
 7. How have peacekeeping failures affected the Haitian and South Sudanese people in the long term?
 8. What mechanisms can be implemented to increase accountability in UN peacekeeping missions?
 9. How can transparency and oversight in UN peacekeeping operations be enhanced to regenerate international trust?
 10. What should be the Security Council's first priority when implementing reforms to UN peacekeeping missions?
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